
Strong functions do not automatically create a strong commercial system. Execution often breaks where information, decisions and responsibilities move from one team to another.
When commercial results disappoint, leadership naturally looks for the function that underperformed. A missed revenue target points towards Sales, a weak campaign towards Marketing and a late launch towards Product or Operations. Budgets, targets and accountability sit inside functions, so that is where the problem becomes visible. That makes the diagnosis feel rigorous, even when it is looking in the wrong place.
Many execution failures start in the handover from one team to the next. A positioning decision becomes a sales conversation, a stocking decision becomes something Sales has to sell, a customer requirement becomes a product priority. The failure becomes visible downstream, in the function that receives the input, while its cause sits upstream or in the exchange itself. Management then applies pressure where the symptom appeared, and the interface that produced it remains untouched.
An interface has three properties that make it vulnerable. First, the producing team optimises its output against its own measures, not against how the receiving team will use it. Marketing material is judged on brand consistency and completeness, while Sales needs something it can use in a twenty-minute conversation. A product roadmap is judged on technical coherence, while the commercial team needs to know which customer problems it will solve first. Each output can be excellent by the standard of the team that made it and still lose much of its value in transfer.
Second, the loss in transfer has no owner. There is a head of Sales and a head of Marketing, but rarely anyone accountable for how well Marketing's output converts into Sales' results, so the loss is absorbed quietly or recorded against the receiving function. Third, information at most interfaces flows in one direction. Decisions travel downstream, while what the downstream team learns about customers, objections and demand rarely travels back with the same authority. The interface loses value and prevents the upstream function from learning why.
At Tech Data, the interface between Product Management and Sales in the components business followed the conventional direction. Product Management decided centrally which products to stock and on what terms, and Sales was then expected to move them. Sales, however, was the part of the organisation in daily contact with what customers were actually trying to buy, and very little of that knowledge shaped the stocking decision before it was made.
The change was to redesign that interface rather than push either side harder. Sales became the primary source of demand intelligence: which products customers were asking for, where the portfolio had gaps, what price levels would make a product competitive and how much volume the market could absorb. Product Management's role shifted towards converting that signal into supply, by identifying vendors, negotiating conditions, securing allocation and managing inventory so that the economics worked. Decisions on portfolio, pricing and volume were increasingly taken jointly rather than handed from one function to the other.
Neither function was replaced or merged, and neither became less specialised. What changed was the direction and quality of what crossed between them. Portfolio choices began to reflect observed demand, Sales gained products it had effectively asked for, and each cycle of decisions produced better information for the next one.
Most organisations do have a mechanism for repairing weak interfaces, but it is informal. Experienced individuals translate between functions, chase decisions that have stalled, rewrite material so that it works in the field and resolve conflicts through personal relationships. They become the people who join things up, although that work rarely appears on an organisation chart or in a measure.
Their work is valuable, but it can also hide a poor handover for years. Because capable people absorb the friction, the interface appears to work, and nobody has a reason to redesign it. The cost becomes visible only when those people move on, when volumes grow beyond what personal effort can bridge, or when new teams join who do not share the accumulated context. Hiring stronger individuals can therefore postpone an interface problem without solving it.
Improving an interface starts with naming it. Leadership can identify the handful of exchanges that matter most for commercial performance, typically between strategy and positioning, positioning and sales conversations, demand signals and product or portfolio decisions, and commercial commitments and delivery. For each, four questions are worth answering explicitly: what must pass across, in what form the receiving team can use it, who decides when the two sides disagree, and how what the receiving team learns returns upstream.
These are ordinary questions, which may be why they are so often left unanswered. Yet they determine whether the expertise inside each function compounds or cancels out. A commercial organisation does not need its functions to think alike, because their different perspectives are why they exist. It needs the exchanges between them to be designed with the same care that already goes into the functions themselves, so that strong departments add up to a strong system rather than a collection of good intentions that lose value at every handover.
I lead every stage personally - from interviews and diagnosis to alignment and activation.
