
Growth conversations often stay trapped inside the current offer. Management looks at how to increase volume, improve conversion, take share or push a familiar category harder, because those are the levers the organisation already understands. The weakness in that approach is that customers do not organise their needs according to the supplier's portfolio. A business can therefore reach the limits of one category while the customer relationship still contains significant untapped value.
Most suppliers organise themselves around categories: product lines, business units, vendor relationships and the teams that manage them. Customers rarely buy that way. They are assembling something, whether a finished system, an operational capability or a solution for their own customers, and each individual product is one component of that larger purchase. The supplier sees a category with a market share. The customer sees a purchase that is either complete or incomplete.
That difference has a consequence that is easy to miss. When a supplier can provide only part of what the customer needs to assemble, the missing parts are not simply revenue the supplier fails to capture. They are also a reason for the customer to place the rest of the purchase somewhere else, with a supplier who can cover more of it. Gaps in adjacent categories therefore suppress performance in the core category too, even when the core offer is competitive on its own terms.
In the components business at Tech Data, that dynamic shaped how the portfolio grew. Customers building complete PCs needed motherboards, graphics cards, memory, storage and cases around the processor, and every category we lacked was a practical reason for them to consolidate their purchasing with another distributor. The question for portfolio growth was no longer which product lines looked attractive in isolation, but which missing categories and vendors would make the overall offer more relevant to system builders. The method was straightforward.
I compared our assortment systematically with what competing distributors carried, looking for important brands that appeared repeatedly in customer demand and were already being sold elsewhere. ASUS stood out quickly. It had a strong technical reputation, positive attention in specialist media and meaningful positions in motherboards and graphics cards, both of which complemented the processor business directly. Customers already knew the brand, and competitors had already demonstrated that the demand was real.
Adding ASUS created a new category, and it also strengthened the business around it. Motherboards and graphics cards reduced the number of components customers still had to source elsewhere, which made the existing processor business more attractive because the surrounding portfolio was more complete. The new category brought its own revenue and made the processor offer more useful at the same time.
Customer access is a genuine advantage when exploring adjacency, because the supplier already understands something about the buyer, the decision process and the commercial context. The relationship helps you see the opportunity. It does not make you credible in the new category. A customer may be willing to discuss an adjacent need because the relationship exists, while the supplier remains an unproven participant in a category with different buying criteria, stronger incumbents and unfamiliar operational demands.
When ASUS joined the portfolio, I knew enough to see the opportunity but not enough to manage the category confidently. Rather than hiding that gap, I asked the ASUS account manager to help me understand the category in depth. We reviewed forecasts, orders and pricing together every week, which gave me access to a far wider view of product momentum, shortages, competitor pricing and launch priorities than Tech Data could have generated on its own. Combined with what Sales heard from customers, that turned a knowledge gap into a fast learning loop, and allowed purchasing to move from reacting to demand towards anticipating it.
The broader point is that entering an adjacent category requires a deliberate route to competence. Some organisations acquire it, some hire it and some borrow it from partners who already have it. What tends to fail is the assumption that a strong relationship in one category will carry the supplier through the learning curve in the next.
The fact that customers buy something elsewhere is not, by itself, a reason to enter that category. Every additional line brings positioning work, enablement, operational requirements and competing priorities, and an adjacency without a clear role in the customer relationship can leave Sales with more choice and less clarity. The useful test is whether the new category removes a reason for the customer to split the purchase, or whether it merely adds something else to sell.
Extensions that pass that test usually share a few features. The products are used together or bought by the same people through the same process. The supplier can credibly develop the necessary competence. And the broader offer makes the customer's situation easier, through fewer vendors, simpler logistics or a more integrated solution, rather than only increasing the supplier's revenue. Where those conditions are absent, adjacency becomes another source of complexity rather than growth.
For account management, this suggests a different kind of account plan. Alongside what the customer currently buys and which opportunities are already in the pipeline, the plan can record where relevant spend still sits with other suppliers and why. The reasons matter more than the amounts.
A missing capability, weak credibility, unclear positioning or simply the fact that nobody has made the connection each lead to a different decision, and understanding the barrier comes before assuming that adjacency equals opportunity. The same pattern across several accounts is useful market intelligence. When customers repeatedly buy the same adjacent category elsewhere, the traditional category boundary may be shifting, or buyers may increasingly expect one supplier to solve a broader problem. A business that notices those patterns can respond before the change is obvious in conventional market data.
When growth in a core category starts to flatten, the instinct is to push that category harder through promotion, sales activity or price. Sometimes the constraint sits in the category itself. Often it sits in what surrounds it, in the parts of the customer's purchase the supplier has never offered, and in the quiet reason those gaps give customers to buy the core somewhere else as well.
I lead every stage personally - from interviews and diagnosis to alignment and activation.
