
One of the easiest ways for a business to lose touch with its market is also one of the least dramatic. Nothing has to collapse. There does not need to be a disastrous strategy, a dysfunctional leadership team or an obvious customer revolt. The organisation can remain busy, professional and apparently well managed while its decisions gradually become shaped more by internal logic than by what customers actually value.
What makes this drift difficult to recognise is that the internal reasoning is rarely foolish. Experienced people make sensible decisions on the evidence in front of them. The weakness lies in how that evidence was produced, because an organisation's picture of its market is assembled through instruments it designed itself, and those instruments tend to report back the questions they were built to ask.
When I took responsibility for Intel at Tech Data, our share of the distribution market was around 17 per cent, which was weak for a brand with Intel's position. The explanation inside the business was straightforward: we were not competitive enough on price. Customers regularly asked for better conditions, and that request was consistent enough to look like proof. So pricing was sharpened, exceptions were made and conditions were improved wherever possible, yet the orders we expected still did not arrive.
Eventually I stopped adjusting the price and called several of our larger customers to ask why they were still buying elsewhere when our offer was competitive. Their answer had little to do with the processor itself. They were assembling complete systems, so buying the CPU from us meant sourcing motherboards, memory, cases and other components from another distributor, with additional purchase orders, deliveries, administration and shipping costs. We had been optimising one product while customers were weighing the effort and cost of the entire purchase.
The customers were not misleading us. They genuinely did ask for lower prices, because price is always negotiable and asking costs nothing. What we had failed to separate was the variable customers negotiated from the variable that decided where they placed the order. The first was loud, frequent and easy to record; the second was rarely stated because nobody had asked the question that would bring it out.
This pattern is not specific to pricing. As organisations grow, they rely increasingly on systems that translate external reality into something manageable. Customer conversations become CRM entries, buying behaviour becomes research findings, sales activity becomes pipeline reports and product feedback becomes prioritised requirements. Each of those translations is necessary, and each one filters. A CRM records the fields it was configured to capture, a lost-deal analysis offers the reasons someone thought to list, and a customer survey measures satisfaction with the things the company already believes matter.
The result is a representation of the market that is tidy, comparable and consistent with the organisation's existing assumptions, because those assumptions designed the instruments. Customers, by contrast, are untidy. They contradict one another, describe symptoms rather than causes, and say different things from what they do. Faced with that contrast, it is natural to trust the internal version, which arrives in agreed formats at scheduled meetings with numbers that can be compared. Over time, internal logic can become self-confirming because the organisation keeps hearing the answers its own questions invite.
The most useful signal in the Intel situation was not anything a customer said. It was the fact that a reasonable, well-executed response to the agreed diagnosis did not change behaviour. When improving the variable everyone believes to be decisive produces little effect, that outcome contains information. It suggests the diagnosis may be wrong, and the right next step is to revisit it rather than to apply the same intervention with more intensity.
Organisations often respond in the opposite way. If price cuts do not work, the cuts were not deep enough; if a campaign underperforms, it needed more budget; if Sales does not use the new material, they need more training. Each escalation is defensible on its own terms, and together they can consume a great deal of money and time while the underlying explanation remains unexamined. When a sensible response repeatedly has little effect, the first question is whether the business has understood the customer correctly.
None of this means customers should dictate strategy, or that a salesperson's report of one account should outweigh broader evidence. Customers are good at describing problems, behaviour and priorities, and much less reliable at specifying solutions. The point is narrower and more practical: the organisation needs routes through which external behaviour can challenge an internal conclusion, and enough openness to act when it does.
Some of those routes are simple. Leaders and product managers can speak directly with customers about why they buy elsewhere, rather than relying only on summarised reports. Lost-deal reviews can include open questions rather than predefined reasons. And when an intervention fails to produce the expected result, the review can begin by asking whether the problem was correctly understood before asking how to execute harder.
At Tech Data, changing the diagnosis changed the strategy. Instead of competing on processor price, the business set out to remove the reasons customers had to buy elsewhere, and Intel share eventually reached around 50 to 60 per cent. The longer-lasting lesson was about diagnosis. An organisation can keep its judgement while staying close enough to the market for evidence to overturn it when necessary.
I lead every stage personally - from interviews and diagnosis to alignment and activation.
