
More market data does not automatically create better foresight. Strategic advantage often depends on how close the organisation is to where change begins.
Companies often believe they understand their market because they have customers in it, competitors they track and salespeople who speak with buyers every day. That information is valuable, but it describes the market at the point where decisions are already being expressed as purchases. In many industries, the decisions that shape what customers will be able to buy are taken further upstream: manufacturers choose which products to prioritise, technology vendors set future architectures, suppliers decide how scarce capacity will be allocated, and regulators or investors change the economics of a category.
By the time those decisions become visible through normal commercial channels, they have usually been made for some time. A business can be close to its customers and still learn about important shifts later than organisations positioned nearer to where those shifts originate. It may then execute quickly and still be late, because the market started moving before it knew there was a decision to make.
Every organisation receives market information through particular routes, and each route has a delay built into it. Customer feedback reports what buyers experience now. Sales data shows where money has already moved. Competitive analysis reveals what others have launched once they have launched it. Market research summarises conditions at the time it was conducted. These sources are reliable precisely because they describe things that have already happened.
Working harder with the same sources does not reduce their delay. Better dashboards, more frequent reviews and faster approval processes all improve how quickly an organisation acts on information it has received, but they do not change when that information arrives. As businesses grow, internal layering can even lengthen the delay. A local observation becomes a regional update and then a management report, and every step that adds context also filters out weak signals that do not yet look important enough to pass on. Leadership ends up with richer data that is, on average, further from the moment of change.
In the components business at Tech Data, much of what we knew about product direction, supply and competitive movement arrived through European price lists, local vendor contacts and products that had already entered distribution. Gigabyte was one of the clearest signals of what that cost us: demand for the brand was building in customer conversations, competitors were already carrying it and specialist media rated its products highly, all before we had acted. A chance conversation at an Intel distributor event with a much smaller reseller who travelled regularly to Taiwan made the point sharper. If a smaller participant could build direct access to the ecosystem where the products were designed and negotiated, there was no good reason for us to remain dependent on a distant view of the same market. That conversation led to TAITRA, Taiwan's trade development organisation, and to an invitation to Computex.
Being physically present in Taipei changed the relationship with Gigabyte in a way I had underestimated. When the company's senior leadership learned I was there, the visit itself signalled seriousness, and it created access that European meetings and calls would not have produced. In one conversation, I was asked how much product I expected to buy in the coming year. My European instinct was to treat the question defensively, since disclosing volume expectations early can weaken a negotiating position.
The purpose turned out to be the opposite. Gigabyte wanted the figure so it could secure the right quantities upstream from AMD and NVIDIA and set my pricing to reflect the business I intended to place. Before the selling year began, I had competitive pricing and quantities that were effectively protected for my region. The point was not simply that relationships matter in Asia. Being close to the decision-making chain meant that my own plans became an input into how upstream resources were allocated, before those allocations reached the European market where competitors would see them.
That reciprocity is the less obvious part of market proximity. Distance from upstream decisions delays what an organisation learns and keeps its intentions out of those decisions. A distributor that discloses its expected demand to a manufacturer who plans around it is not merely receiving better information. It is shaping the supply conditions that the rest of the market will later have to accept.
A similar logic applied when a direct relationship developed with NVIDIA, which sat upstream of several manufacturers whose products we distributed. That relationship brought earlier visibility of roadmaps and launches, better access to allocation when supply was constrained and access to the wider ecosystem around the category. The commercially important relationship was not always with the brand on the box; sometimes it was with the company shaping several of those brands at once.
Proximity is not something an organisation can simply decide to acquire. When I later tried to build a comparable direct relationship with AMD, including senior-level engagement around CES, it developed differently, with AMD preferring a more indirect approach through brand-specific programmes. By then Tech Data held a strong position across components, and my interpretation was that AMD may have been reluctant to concentrate that much upstream access in one distributor. Whatever the exact reasoning, the contrast was instructive. Upstream players have their own interest in managing how much influence any single partner accumulates, and the more powerful a participant becomes, the more carefully others may control its access.
That makes market proximity a negotiated position rather than a permanent advantage. It depends on offering genuine value to the parties upstream, through reliable demand, useful market knowledge and disciplined execution, and on recognising that access granted by one player may be deliberately limited by another.
Senior leaders need to know where their information originates and how early it arrives. Which relationships expose the business to decisions before they reach the market? Where are customer choices being shaped before customers articulate them, and who in the organisation takes part in those conversations? Which partners understand technological, regulatory or supply changes earlier than the business does, and what does the business offer them in return?
The answers vary by industry. For an industrial company, the decisive conversations may happen with engineers writing specifications long before procurement begins. In software, a platform or technology partner may shape architectures before demand forms. The point is consistent across industries: an organisation's information network should reflect the structure of its market, rather than just its own sales process. Early signals still need testing against customers, economics and capability before resources are committed. Their value lies in starting the clock sooner, so that the business has time to investigate, prepare and sometimes influence what happens next, instead of discovering the change at the same moment as everyone else.
I lead every stage personally - from interviews and diagnosis to alignment and activation.
